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Labor Markets: Three Essays
Caitlin Knowles Myers
Nearly 50 years after the peak ofthe Civil Rights
movement, inequality persists in American society.
However, while the existence of racial and gender
differentials is generally well known, and the act
of observing and measuring these differentials is
straightforward, their source remains more elusive.
Although the three essays that comprise this dissertation
focus on different markets and use different data, they are
all united in an attempt to more thoroughly understand
the magnitude and source of inequality in our society. The
first essay uses self-collected data from local television
news stations to explore a new theoretical model affirm
differentiation in response to customer discrimination.
The second uses panel data for spatial clusters of homes
to examine the interplay of neighborhood characteristics,
household race, and housing prices. The third essay
uses the repeal of state-sponsored affirmative action in
California as a natural experiment for measuring the
impact of removing affirmative action.
As a whole, the essays in this dissertation highlight
the importance of taking into account not only direct
discriminatory behavior, but also the more subtle forces
of preference and prejudice. In the local news market,
although customers themselves are not forcing firms to
segregate, it is their preferences that drive that outcome.
In housing markets it is the prejudices of neighbors
that cause housing prices to fall following an influx of
blacks, although these neighbors themselves are not
taking money out of anybody's hands. Yet when looking
at affirmative action, 25 years of state policy aimed at
changing preferences and prejudices evidently has not
had the desired impact. These essays sound a cautionary
note for government. Even if we could effectively
eliminate supplier discrimination in housing or employer
discrimination in labor markets, the preferences of
demanders could continue to drive inequality.
I now turn to a brief overview of each of the essays in
tum.

Chapter 1
Labor Market Discrimination as a Competitive
Device: The Case of Local Television News
Local television news does not seem to fit the mold
that we economists have cast for customer discrimination.
As Gary Becker (1957) first demonstrated, the racial
preferences of customers can directly affect the marginal
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revenue product of labor of different groups and, hence,
labor market outcomes. But if, as is frequently suggested,
consumers prefer not to interact with minority employees,
then why do we see so many blacks, Asians, and
Hispanics on the local news? In 2002 an average of 21
percent of broadcast news employees at local television
stations were minorities versus 12 percent of newspaper
journalists and 8 percent of radio broadcast employees
(Robert Paper 2003; American Society of Newspaper
Editors [ASNE] 2003). Given the frequent supposition
of prejudice against minorities, it seems strange at
first glance that minorities have greater representation
in the more visible media. Might it be the case that
customers actually have a preference for diversity in some
circumstances? Or are other factors at play here?
Casual observations of diversity are not the only
source of interest in the market for local television
news. IdentifYing the presence and extent of customer
discrimination is not an easy task; it requires either
directly or indirectly finding a way to measure the
preferences of different labor market agents and how
these attitudes affect labor market outcomes. As a result,
most studies of customer discrimination have focused on
professional sports, where worker output and customer
demand are easily observable. The evidence from these
studies has varied considerably with the particular sport,
time period, and type of position examined. Gwartney
and Haworth (1974) find that black players increased
attendance at baseball games in the 1950s; Sommers and
Quinton (1982) find that blacks had an insignificant effect
on baseball tearn revenue in the 1970s; and Nardinelli
and Simon (1990) find that baseball cards picturing
minority players sell for less than those of white players.
Studies of basketball have tended to find evidence of
discrimination (e.g., Kahn and Sherer 1988; Burdekin and
Idson 1991; Kanazawa and Funk 200 I) with the exception
of trading cards for players from the 1970s (Stone
and Warren 1999). Looking at football quarterbacks,
Arcidiacono et al. (2004) find evidence of customer
tastes for diversity. The disparities in the empirical
literature could indicate that the degree and magnitude
of customer discrimination is affected by the visibility of
employees and the racial composition of customers and/or
employees. Recent studies of markets in which a large
percentage of employees are black tend to find evidence
of discrimination, while studies in which blacks are not
as prevalent or as visible are less likely to find evidence
of discrimination. Finally, none of these studies, which
all rely on sports markets and firms with little direct
competition, have allowed for the consideration that firms
may choose to differentiate along the lines of employee
characteristics as a competitive device.
Television news presents another window into
customer discrimination, both because employees are
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visible to customers and because it offers a measure
of customer preferences through television ratings. In
this paper, I use a combination of Nielsen ratings for
November 2003 broadcasts of local television news in
25 U.S. cities and self-collected data on the demographic
characteristics of on-air personalities. Because there is
evidence of sorting among stations within a market, with
some having a much larger number of minorities on their
newscasts than others, I present a theory demonstrating
that customer discrimination can cause intramarket
segregation in which firms select their racial compositions
to cater to certain groups of customers. This theory relies
on one adjustment to the assumptions of the classic
Becker model of customer discrimination: I assume that
customers interact with more than one employee at a finn
and that they care about the overall racial composition of
the firm. With this rather modest change, it is relatively
simple to view the composition of employees as yet
another dimension along which firms might choose to
differentiate, and with most formulation ofthe costs and
benefits of differentiation, I obtain a Nash equilibrium in
which finns are indeed predicted to use discrimination as
a competitive device.
Looking at the data on local television news, I find
first that there is a strong negative correlation between
the racial, age, and gender composition of competing
stations. Furthermore, because of the notoriously
large labor pool of television journalists, this negative
correlation is unlikely to be attributable to supply factors.
As further evidence that firms have some flexibility in the
racial characteristics of their hires, I show that changes
in Equal Employee Opportunity enforcement regimes
explain some, but far from all, of the differences in station
compositions.
Turning to the question of demand, if firms are
indeed using employee composition as a means of
differentiation, then the response of viewers to small
changes in composition should be different for the
different firms. Indeed, this prediction holds in a rather
striking way. Consider the case of black employees. If a
straightforward customer taste for discrimination holds,
then ratings should either rise or fall with the addition
of black newscasters. If there is instead a nonlinear taste
for diversity, then ratings should rise as blacks are added
until the customer "bliss point" is reached, at which time
ratings should fall. However, I find a very different result
from the two possibilities that have previously been
considered. Figure I presents market/time-slot fixedeffect estimates of mean Nielsen rating as a function of
the match between a station's black composition and the
market's black composition. The variable black match
is constructed so that a match of less than 100 indicates
that a station has fewer blacks relative to the market in
which it broadcasts and a match of over 100 indicates
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Figure 1 Impact of Station/City Black Match on
Nielsen Rating
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that the station overrepresents blacks relative to the
market. Strikingly, stations with few blacks see a decline
in ratings as they add black employees, while for a wide
range of stations with an overrepresentation of blacks,
we see that ratings rise as they add blacks. I go on to
show similar results for gender and age composition
but obtain predictions for Asians and Hispanics that
are more consistent with a customer taste for diversity.
These findings suggest another layer of complexity
to consider with the basic Becker model of customer
discrimination. Local news stations appear to respond
to the racial composition of their competitors and try to
differentiate themselves by race, age, and sex of their
on-air employees. For three of the five groups examined,
the ratings regressions indicate that the response of
consumers varies with the racial composition of the firms
in a manner consistent with the predictions of this model
of racial differentiation. Viewers of the more "white"
stations have a stronger negative reaction to an increase in
blacks than do viewers of the "black" stations, suggesting
that stations with few blacks cater to consumers with
a high discrimination coefficient against blacks, while
stations with more blacks cater to customers who are less
prejudiced or who prefer blacks. Similarly, viewers of
stations with more females and older employees have a
smaller negative response to these groups than viewers
of stations with lower concentrations. While the results
for Hispanics and Asians suggest a customer preference
for diversity rather than differentiation or strict racial
preferences as originally modeled in the literature, it
seems likely that the exclusion of foreign language local
news has biased the estimates. Taken as a whole, the
results here suggest that customer discrimination may be
a more complex phenomenon than we have previously
considered. This added complexity, moreover, suggests
that we need to rethink the welfare implications of
customer discrimination and the heretofore accepted fact
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that customer discrimination would always produce wage
differentials that would not be eliminated by competition.

Chapter 2
Discrimination and Neighborhood Effects:
Understanding Racial Differentials in U.S.
Housing Prices
(Published in the Journal of Urban Economics,
September 2004)
Research on racial housing price differentials has
yielded vastly different results ranging from indications
in the early literature that black households pay premiums
for housing to estimates of significant discounts in the
more recent literature. This decline and reversal of the
differential might be due to a reduction in discriminatory
practices over the past 40 years. However, differences
in estimation techniques and data sets may also explain
some, perhaps all, of the perceived decline.
The key to identifying the results of discrimination is
to ask whether blacks and whites pay different amounts
for identical housing. This requires controlling not
only for characteristics of the house itself, but also
for characteristics of the surrounding neighborhood.
Controlling for neighborhood effects is important for two
reasons. First, as described in this essay, economic theory
predicts that discrimination can produce price differentials
within a neighborhood, while prejudice and segregation
produce price differentials between neighborhoods. Thus,
if neighborhood characteristics are not controlled for,
these forces will be confused and it will be impossible to
separate the causes of an observed racial price differential.
Second, evidence suggests that black neighborhoods
tend to have relatively higher crime rates, lower wealth,
poorer provision of public goods, and other negative
characteristics. Since being black is correlated with living
in a black neighborhood, a researcher who does not
control for neighborhood characteristics may find that
blacks tend to pay less for housing than do whites. Such
a result would be biased by neighborhood quality and
would not reliably indicate the presence or absence of
discrimination.
In relatively recent studies, such as Chambers (1992)
and Kiel and Zabel (1996), researchers have typically
used large national data sets and, if they controlled for
neighborhood characteristics at all, have used census
tracts or larger areas as neighborhood proxies. Census
tracts, the smallest areas that have been used, have
between 1,500 and 8,000 inhabitants, with an optimum
given by the census bureau of 4,000 inhabitants. Given
that the Census Bureau reports that the average number
of people per household in the United States was 2.62
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in 2000, a census tract with 4,000 inhabitants would
represent about 1,527 houses, or about 100 city blocks
of 15 houses each. Although the Census Bureau intends
them to be proxies for neighborhoods, it seems likely
that there is still substantial variation within tracts with
such a large number of houses. The results of studies
using these proxies indicate that blacks receive price
discounts relative to whites. However, since neighborhood
racial composition and other amenities may have been
insufficiently controlled for, this negative finding could
be due to the tendency of blacks to live in lower-priced
black neighborhoods rather than due to the absence of
discriminatory behavior of suppliers.
This essay attempts to remedy this problem by
controlling for neighborhoods at a much smaller level
than that of census tracts. The 1985, 1989, and 1993
national American Housing Surveys (AHS) contain
a special "neighbors sample" that is composed of
sub-sampled "kernel" housing units and observations
about the 10 nearest neighbors of each. Using these
data, I control for the racial composition, educational
attainment, income levels, and other characteristics of
neighborhoods defined by relatively small areas that
should be more homogenous than census tracts. By using
information about the composition of the neighbor group
surrounding each household, I hope to more thoroughly
control for neighborhood effects, and thus be able to
separate any racial price differential into portions that are
I) due to neighborhood effects, and 2) due to supplier
discrimination. I also deviate from previous studies,
which have used only cross-sectional techniques and take
advantage of the time-series characteristics of the AHS.
I use these data first to demonstrate that adding
measures of neighborhood characteristics dramatically
lowers the magnitude of the negative coefficient on
householder race, suggesting that unobserved variable
bias has indeed been a factor in finding little evidence of
discrimination in recent years. However, even with more
thorough neighborhood controls than has previously been
possible, Hausman specification tests still indicate that
unobserved variable bias is a problem. For this reason, I
utilize the time-series nature of the data by implementing
address-specific fixed effects. These estimates indicate
that blacks pay approximately 10 percent more than
whites for identical housing in identical neighborhoods,
providing evidence of supplier discrimination. Although
this coefficient becomes significant only at the 10 percent
level, it is measuring how values changed for a given
house when the race of the occupants changed, holding
constant the remaining neighborhood racial composition,
which is exactly what we wish to capture to separate
neighborhood composition from discrimination. This
offers evidence that supplier price discrimination may
still be a force in the ownership market but that it has not
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been reliably captured in previous studies because of bias
caused by omitted neighborhood effects.
The estimates also provide evidence that prejudice
causes house prices to fan as the percentage of blacks
in a neighborhood increases. Looking at this effect
in three types of neighborhoods~those that start off
predominantly white, integrated, and predominantly
black~1 find evidence of declining house prices in all
three as the percentage of blacks rises. The coefficient
on racial composition in integrated neighborhoods is
negative, but with ap-value of 0.107 is insignificant.
However, the estimates indicate that a 10-percentagepoint increase in the percent of neighborhood
residents who are black lowers house values in black
neighborhoods by an average of 4.8 percent and
lowers values in white neighborhoods by an average
of 7.1 percent. This significant difference indicates
that the impact of racial composition is larger in white
neighborhoods than in black neighborhoods.
These results are noteworthy because, for the first time
in over two decades, we've had data that allow for the
separation of neighborhood effects from discrimination
effects which in turn has provided evidence that
discrimination does continue to playa role in U.S.
housing markets.

Chapter 3
A Cure for Discrimination? Affirmative Action
and the Case of California Proposition 209
(Revised and resubmitted to Industrial and Labor
Relations Review, summer 2006)
Introducing and removing affirmative action are not
opposite sides of the same coin. Proponents of affirmative
action maintain that it will provide a long-term cure for
discrimination by allowing victims to demonstrate their
skill and worth, thus changing prejudicial attitudes. Under
this scenario, if affirmative action "works," then when it
is time to drop the program there will be no deleterious
effects for minorities. Opponents of these controversial
programs, however, argue that it does not address the
root source of inequality and, moreover, that it may
create labor market inefficiencies and result in reverse
discrimination against white males. Both sides, therefore,
suggest that an effective affirmative action program would
cause minority employment to rise, but they disagree on
whether this increase is efficient and whether it would be
sustainable if formal affirmative action were ended.
To date, there has been little opportunity to measure
the impact of removing affirmative action programs.
While federal support for enforcement has ebbed and
flowed, and Supreme Court rulings in the past decade
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have chipped away at affirmative action, it is difficult to
say whether concurrent changes in minority outcomes
were due to affirmative action policy or other trends in
inequality. A similar problem plagued attempts to measure
the impact of instituting affirmative action in earlier
years. While minorities and women made gains in the
labor market in the 1970s and 1980s, it is not clear what
portion of this was due to affinnative action and what
was the result of other influences. Empirical studies of the
impact of affirmative action on labor markets have relied
on differences in outcomes for government contractors,
who are subject to the program, and noncontractors, who
are not. While these studies have provided evidence of
minority gains among contracting firms, the results could
be biased because contractor status is not exogenous:
firms with the lowest cost of meeting affirmative action
requirements may be more likely to be contractors. Hence,
we are left with an incomplete picture of both the impact
of a controversial program and the potential consequences
of its removal. What is needed is a control group to which
we can compare changes in outcomes for those affected
by affirmative action.
The enactment of California Proposition 209 provides
just such an opportunity. The measure, passed in the
1996 state elections and made effective in November
of 1997, essentially outlawed existing local and state
affirmative action programs in education, public hiring,
and contracting, unless superseded by federal law. This
change in state policy presents a natural experiment
for measuring the labor market impact of removing of
affirmative action programs. I use Current Population
Survey (CPS) data to compare outcomes for minorities
in California before and after affirmative action was
removed to those same outcomes for white males. Then,
to control for national trends in minority differentials,
I compare this difference to the difference for a control
group: states not undergoing similar changes in the law.
The use of this triple difference technique to analyze the
impact of removing affirmative action on employment,
unemployment, labor force participation, and wages
provides evidence on the long-term effects of affirmative
action.
The triple difference estimates in this analysis rely
on three divisions of the data. First, the observations are
categorized as before or after the enactment of proposition
209 (e.g., 1995 or 1999, 1995 or 2000, and so on,
depending on the years being used). Second, individuals
are divided into eight mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive categories: white males, white females,
black males, black females, other males, other females,
Hispanic males, and Hispanic females. And third, the
country is divided into two groups: an experimental state
(California) and the remaining control states or "nation." I
use probits to examine the impact of removing affirmative
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programs on labor force status and linear regression
models to look at the impact on wages. In the case of
the former, I am careful in correctly calculating and
interpreting the average marginal effects for a nonlinear
model, which is frequently and incorrectly done by simply
calculating the marginal effect of the coefficient on the
triple interaction tenn.
Looking at labor force status, the estimates indicate
that between 1995 and 1999 the relative employment
of all minorities fell by 2.8 percentage points while
nonparticipation rose by 2.9 percentage points. Similarly,
between 1995 and 2000 relative employment fell by 1.8
percentage points (but the change is not significant),
and nonparticipation rose by 2.2 percentage points;
between 1995 and 2001 relative employment fell by 2.2
percentage points while non participation rose by 2.0
percentage points. Breaking this down by group, between
1995 and 1999 relative nonparticipation rose by 2.9
percentage points for white females, 4.6 percentage points
for black females, 1.4 percentage points for Hispanic
males, 5.2 percentage points for Hispanic females, and
6.8 percentage points for other males. This increase in
nonparticipation accounts for nearly all of the decline in
employment for all groups except black females, who
also saw a drop in unemployment. Only black males and
other females do not exhibit significant changes in labor
force status between 1995 and 1999. By 200 1, however,
there appears to have been a rise in nonparticipation for
all minority groups except for black men, who show a
significant fall in nonparticipation. That there is little
evidence of negative impact on black men is in keeping
with previous findings (e.g., Holzer and Neumark 2000)
that in later years affirmative action had a greater impact
on women, but it should also be noted that the sample of
black males in California in smaller than any of the other
minority groups.
As a whole, the results suggest that Proposition 209
moved females and minorities out of the labor force. If,
as the results indicate, the removal of affinnative action
made it more difficult for women and minorities to find
work, then this exit from the labor force is not surprising.
Previous work has tended to indicate that women have
more elastic labor supplies than men and that they tend
to be more responsive along the extensive participation
margin (Blau 2005) In addition, when looking at the
impact of minimum wage legislation, Mincer (1976) finds
that affected groups tend to leave the labor force and,
moreover, that females and minorities have relatively
high participation elasticities. Furthennore, these
estimates look at the impact of Proposition 209 a year
and more after its implementation. It may be the case
that these groups did initially move from employment to
unemployment but that by 1999 they became discouraged
and left the labor force.
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Turning from labor force status to wages, there is no
clear prediction of the impact ofrernoving affinnative
action on wages. Relative wage changes will depend on
the nature of preexisting discrimination, the effectiveness
of affirmative action, and the relative skill levels of the
groups affected by its removal. It is thus not surprising
that, as a whole, the results do not show a consistent effect
for any of the groups. This could indicate that affirmative
action had little effect on wages. Affirmative action
laws, after all, did not directly address wage equality,
which was covered by equal employment law. It could
also be the result of skill selection among those leaving
employment. Since the wage regressions are conditional
on employment, the wages of those who remain employed
could rise because they are relatively more skilled or fall
because they are relatively less skilled than those who
left.
Because the removal of state-sponsored affinnative
action in California appears to have the greatest impact
on labor force participation, I then consider alternative
explanations for the observed fall in participationchanges in school enrollment patterns, immigration
policy, child care policy, incarceration rates, and welfare
reform. I show that each in turn does not appear likely to
have produced the observed effect.
Given that this large decline in minority labor-market
participation in California seems to be due to the removal
of extensive state affinnative action programs, this result
raises doubts about their efficacy to begin with. The drop
in participation is consistent with one of three hypotheses
from the theoretical literature: 1) that affirmative action
is inefficient and creates reverse discrimination, 2) that
affinnative action is ineffective at engendering pennanent
change in prejudices that create labor market inequality,
or 3) that the sources of inequality are not prejudicebased. A final possibility is that California's affirmative
action programs had not been in place long enough to
engender pennanent alteration in inequality. However,
given that California had pursued affirmative action for
over a generation, this may be equally discouraging.

Note
All the references can be found in the original dissertation.
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